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In September 1999, eighteen-year-old Jesse Gelsinger tragically
died while participating in a University of Pennsylvania gene transfer
experiment.' The lawsuit that followed this unfortunate incident
named as defendants not only the researchers involved but also re-
nowned bioethicist Arthur Caplan. Although a hospital ethics com-
mittee was named in a lawsuit more than ten years earlier,' there had
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Alex Lapinski, In Aftermath of Gelsinger's Death, Tighter Rules for Tests, DAILY
PENNSYLVANIAN, Nov. 6, 2001, http://www.dailypennsylvanian.com/vn-ews/display.v/
ART/2001/l1/06/3be7b02f2e42?inarchive=1. This type of experiment is more
commonly known as "gene therapy." There has been much debate about the appro-
priateness of this term, however, because it implies that the "experiment" or "research"
will actually have a beneficial effect on the subject. 'Confusion of "therapy" for "re-
search" is a serious issue in debates about informed consent in research, and bioethics
generally. See Larry R. Churchill et al., Genetic Research as Therapy: Implications of "Gene
Therapy"for Informed Consent, 26J.L. MED. & ETHICS 38, 45 (1998) (noting a "persistent
failure to distinguish clearly between research and therapy in medical science"); M.
Therese Lysaught, Commentary: Reconstruing Genetic Research as Research, 26J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 48, 48 (1998) (attempting to "contextualize further Churchill et al.'s argu-
ments in the experience of [the National Institutes of Health's Recombinant DNA Ad-
viso 7 Committee] and the history of gene transfer research").
Complaint at 6-7, Gelsinger v. Univ. of Pa., No. 001885 (Pa. Ct. Com. P1. Phila.
filed Sept. 18, 2000) (on file with author).
Elizabeth Bouvia named an ethics committee (both as a whole and its members
individually) as a defendant after physicians, supposedly acting under the committee's
direction, inserted a nasogastric tube in Bouvia against her wishes. Bouvia v. Superior
Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 297 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); see a/soJUDITH WILSON ROSS ET AL.,
HEALTH CARE ETHICS COMMITYEES: THE NEXT GENERATION 135 (1993) (examining
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not been any other such instances until the Gelsinger case in 2000.
However, since the Gelsinger lawsuit was filed (it was ultimately settled
out of court), at least one more lawsuit has named bioethicists as de-
fendants. 4  Accordingly, bioethicists have begun to worry about the
possibility of being found liable for the advice they give) Due to the
close contact with traditional decision makers in the clinical context
(i.e., patients and physicians), bioethicists who participate in individ-
ual case consultations have become especially concerned about poten-
tial exposure to liability for their advice under tort law.6 Hence, the
potential liability of these "clinical ethicists"7 has become a hot topic
in legal, medical, bioethical, and sociological circles.
Bouvia's case); Andrew L. Merritt, The Tort Liability of Hospital Ethics Committees, 60 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1239, 1250-52 (1987) (discussing the facts of Bouvia to demonstrate "that
ethics committees are involved in decisions that can lead to litigation"). After Bouvia
was granted an injunction to have the tube removed, Bouvia, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 307, she
dropped the suit. "Although the plaintiff in that case, Elizabeth Bouvia, never pursued
her action against the ethics committee to final decision or judgment, the mere filing
of the case sent shudders through the bioethics community." ROSS ET AL., supra, at
135.
4 Complaint, Robertson v. McGee, No. 01CV0O0GOH(M) (N.D. Okla. filed 2001),
http://www.sskrplaw.com/gene/robertson/complaint.html. The bioethicists named
in this suit were all members of the Institutional Review Board (1RB) that reviewed and
approved the research protocol in the case. The complaint alleged that the IRB de-
fendants "did not properly perform their functions in that they failed to examine the
design of the protocol,... review the operation of the Trial, assure the protection of
the participants,... ensure proper reporting, and make certain that the Trial com-
ported with ethical standards." Id.
5 This general concern from the bioethics community was the driving force be-
hind the organization of a Symposium, co-sponsored by the Center for Bioethics and
the School of Law at the University of Pennsylvania, entitled The Legal Duties of the
Bioethicist. In fact, Arthur Caplan was one of the organizers of the symposium. (Anita
L. Allen-Castellitto was the other organizer.) The Symposium occurred on April 11,
2001.
6 It is important to note that there has been no judicial pronouncement regarding
the liability of ethics committees or individual clinical ethicists. In fact, the only known
case brought against a bioethicist in the clinical context is that brought by Bouvia, but
that case was dropped. ROSS ET AL., supra note 3, at 135. The other cases previously
mentioned, Gelsinger and Robertson, involved bioethicists in the research context. See
supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing the Gelsinger lawsuit); supra note 4
(summarizing the Robertson lawsuit). They also settled before final decisions could be
reached in the cases. The potential legal liability of research bioethicists is beyond the
scope of this paper. These cases are mentioned only to illustrate why bioethicists in
every context have begun to be concerned about exposure to legal liability.
In this Comment, the terms "clinical ethicist" and "ethics consultant" will be
used interchangeably for the sake of consistency with the existing literature discussing
these individuals. However, John C. Fletcher argues that these are not synonymous.
He writes, "The role of those who specialize in nurturing the activity of clinical ethics is
better understood as that of a 'consultant in clinical ethics,' than of an 'ethicist.' This
term avoids the implication of elitism or domination of the process of clinical ethics."
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Hospital ethics committees have been the focus of many discus-
sions ever since the New Jersey Supreme Court decided In re Quinlan."
In the years since that decision, however, ethics consultation has
ceased to be performed solely by committees. In fact, consultations
performed by individual clinical ethicists are becoming increasingly
popular.9 One reason for this may be the functional aspects of the in-
creasing demand for ethics consultations'0 -ethics committees are dif-
ficult to call to action on a moment's notice 11 and they can only han-
dle one case at a time; whereas individual ethicists are easy to contact,
and multiple individual ethicists can work on different cases simulta-
neously." Another reason is that "[h]ealth care professionals...
probably are more likely to ask for help from an ethics consultant
than from an ethics committee" because the health care professionals
are familiar, and therefore comfortable, with requesting consultations
from individual medical specialists. 3 Finally, the growing popularity
of consultations with individual ethicists may be attributed simply to
the belief that "[c]onsultations are almost always better when per-
formed one-on-one.'
4
Janet Fleetwood and Stephanie Unger are quick to note, however,
that the competing models of consultation by individual and consulta-
tion by committee both have "advantages and shortcomings." Re-
John C. Fletcher, The Bioethics Movement and Hospital Ethics Committees, 50 MD. L. REV.
859, 860 n.4 (1991). For further discussion of why an "implication of elitism" or per-
ceived "domination of the process of clinical ethics" is problematic, see infra Part I.
355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976); see infra notes 180-85 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing Quinlan).
I See infra note 16 and accompanying text (explaining that the individual ethics
consultant is replacing the ethics committee as the primary provider of ethics consulta-
tions).
10 See Mark P. Aulisio et al., Health Care Ethics Consultation: Nature, Goals, and Com-
petencies, 133 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 59, 59 (2000) (noting "the growing prevalence of
ethics consultation").
11 See BOWEN HOSFORD, BrOETHICS COMMITTEES: THE HEALTH CARE PROVIDER'S
GuIDE 98 (1986) ("Committees are cumbersome. It takes time to assemble a group.").
See ROSS ET AL., supra note 3, at 98 ("A clinical ethics consultant can provide
timely, efficient, and consistent responses to ethical problems in patient care.").
I ld.
14 GeorgeJ. Annas, Ethics Committees: From Ethical Comfort to Ethical Cover, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., May-June 1991, at 18, 19.
it, Janet Fleetwood & Stephanie S. Unger, Institutional Ethics Committees and the
Shield of Immunity, 120 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 320, 321 (1994). For discussions of
these advantages and shortcomings, see Judith Wilson Ross, Case Consultation: The
Committee or the Clinical Consultant?, 5 HOSP. ETiiCS COMMITrEE F. 289; Mark Siegler &
Peter A. Singer, Clinical Ethics Consultations: Godsend or "God Squad?," 85 AM. J. MED.
759 (1988).
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gardless of whatever shortcomings consultations by individual clinical
ethicists may have, "the ethics consultant is replacing the ethics com-
mittee in [consultations]." " For this reason, this Comment will focus
on analyzing the potential legal liability of individual clinical ethicists.
Since committee discussion has been the major format for ethics
consultations for longer than individual interaction, committees have
been the focus of many more academic inquiries, which include such
issues as who should be members, what role they should play in con-
sultations, and what their potential exposure is to legal liability (both
as a whole, and their members individually). In spite of the differ-
ences between consultations performed by ethics committees and
those carried out by individual clinical ethicists, these discussions of
ethics committees can be very useful when considering the individual
ethicist. In fact, there are many instances in which the previous analy-
ses are directly applicable to the discussion of individual ethicists. 7
In Part I of this Comment, I discuss the variety of tasks individual
clinical ethicists may perform, explain the focus on ethics consulta-
tions, and provide an example of a situation in which a clinical ethics
consultation might prove to be useful. In Part II, I provide a defini-
tion of "clinical ethics," refute objections that ethics consultation is
unnecessary or undesirable, and present two opposing views of what
clinical ethicists' role should be in case consultations. In Part III, I fo-
cus on why legal liability has only recently become an issue for clinical
ethicists. Finally, in Part IV, I analyze specific types of liability to which
a clinical ethicist could be exposed for her involvement in an individ-
ual case consultation. This Part ends with my conclusion that clinical
ethicists' role in case consultations should be largely that of mediators,
or facilitators of moral consensus, in order to limit their exposure to
potential liability.
I. WHAT Do CLINICAL ETHICISTS Do?
Clinical ethicists generally perform three main functions. First,
they are often asked to provide ethical input for the development and
implementation of patient care guidelines and policies for various
16 Annas, supra note 14, at 19; see also Terrence F. Ackerman, Conceptualizing the
Role of the Ethics Consultant: Some Theoretical Issues, in ETHICS CONSULTATION IN HEALTH
CARE 37, 37 (John C. Fletcher et al. eds., 1989) ("Evidence suggests that [the individ-
ual ethicist providing consultation to an attending physician regarding the care of a
particular patient] is the most frequently utilized form of ethics consultation.").
In these instances, I will simply cite to or quote those prior arguments, even
though they refer specifically to ethics committees.
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health care institutions."' Second, clinical ethicists are often asked to
educate health care professionals (e.g., physicians, nurses, etc.) within
an institution about ethical concerns associated with the care of pa-
tients."' Third, the most often discussed function clinical ethicists are
asked to perform is individual case consultation, in response to either
a patient's or a physician's request.
20
Judith Hendrick lists three other functions that clinical ethicists
are asked to perform: "reducing litigation, helping to protect
healthcare professionals legally by making them aware of any applica-
ble law, and providing a forum for discussion of legal issues." 2' Other
authors do not list these three tasks, a phenomenon that could be at-
tributed to the refusal of clinical ethicists and health care institutions
to identify publicly any watchdog-type activities as the responsibility of
the clinical ethicist. It could also be due to the lack of consensus by
academics and participants (e.g., health care institutions, clinical ethi-
cists, physicians, patients) concerning whether or not clinical ethicists
should be performing these functions. For example, John Fletcher
recognizes that ethics consultations help to keep physicians' fear of
liability from interfering with good medical practice because they help
to reduce the number of "unnecessary" malpractice suits.2 2 However,
he shares the view that an ethics committee should not become a fo-
rum for risk management.3 When considered simultaneously,
Fletcher's statements could be interpreted to mean that although eth-
ics consultations may help reduce litigation, this should not be the
designated function or the goal of the clinical ethicist. Many involved
,8 John C. Fletcher & Dianne E. Hoffmann, Ethics Committees: Time to Experiment
with Standards, 120 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 335, 336 (1994); Anne-Marie Slowther &
Tony Hope, Clinical Ethics Committees: They Can Change Clinical Practice but Need Evalua-
tion, 321 BRIT. MED.J. 649, 650 (2000).
9 Fletcher & Hoffmann, supra note 18, at 336; Slowther & Hope, supra note 18, at
650.
20 Fletcher & Hoffmann, supra note 18, at 336; Slowther & Hope, supra note 18, at
649. The term "patient" will generally be used to refer not only to the patient herself,
but also to the patient's family or any other designated guardian for the patient in in-
stances where the patient is not-in a position to make a decision for herself. Similarly,
the term "physician" will generally include any health care provider who would have to
make a treatment decision, such as a nurse.
21 Judith Hendrick, Legal Aspects of Clinical Ethics Committees, 27J. MED. ETHICS i50,
i51 (2001).
22 Fletcher, supra note 7, at 879. Fletcher defines "unnecessary" malpractice suits
as "suits that arise because ethical problems left unresolved at the bedside smolder and
then flame into disputes." Id.
23 See Fletcher & Hoffmann, supra note 18, at 336 ("An ethics committee that be-
comes a forum for risk management has abdicated its mission.").
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parties are concerned that if clinical ethicists are asked to perform
these tasks, "legal" will come to be equated with "ethical," even though
the two are not necessarily synonymous, 4 and that clinical ethicists will
abandon consideration of the latter for the former.
This Comment will focus on the clinical ethicist's role as a con-
sultant for individual cases because it is the most likely to expose the
ethics consultant to potential liability; the clinical ethicists' roles as
educator and policymaker are incredibly unlikely to produce instances
in which they could be held liable for the advice they give.
A. What Would Constitute an "Ethics Consultation"?
It is important to understand that "[e] thics consultation is a genus
which encompasses a variety of species.,'25 Fletcher provides a mini-
malist definition of "ethics consultation": "a meeting, or series of
meetings on a continuum from 'informal' to 'formal,' between per-
son(s) in need of help with an ethical problem and person(s) ap-
pointed to provide such help. ' '6  From this, it is possible to define
"clinical ethics consultation" in the following manner: a meeting be-
tween a patient, her physician, and an ethics consultant, in which the
ethicist assists the patient and physician in resolving their ethical dis-
agreement. A more specific, detailed definition would not be gen-
eral enough to encompass the significant variation among competing
conceptions of exactly how the ethics consultation should be per-
formed.
Instead of discussing these divergent views in the abstract, the fol-
lowing subsection introduces an example of a situation in which an
24 For further discussion of this issue, see infra Part III.
25 Ackerman, sup-a note 16, at 37; see also David C. Thomasma, Ethics Consultation
Rules: A Comment on GeorgeJ Agich, AM. J. BIOETHICs, Fall 2001, at 46, 46 ("[E] thics
consultation is a complex form of human interaction, of interpretation, of balance be-
tween values and identity of patients, families, professionals, institutions, and cul-
ture.").
26John C. Fletcher, Standards for Evaluation of Ethics Consultation, in ETHIics
CONSULTATION IN HEALTH CARE, supra note 16, at 173, 175.
27 An ethics consultation could be requested even though there is not a disagree-
ment between the patient and the physician. A moral dilemma can occur within a sin-
gle person, as well. SeeJohn C. Fletcher et al., Clinical Ethics: Histoy, Content, and Re-
sources, in INTRODUCTION TO CLINICAL ETHICs 3, 11 (John C. Fletcher et al. eds., 2d ed.
1997). However, situations in which the patient would be unsure of what option to
choose without knowing what the physician thinks is best are rare. Therefore, the
overwhelming majority of requests for ethics consultations will involve either an actual
or a potential disagreement between patient and physician. See also infra note 57 (ex-
plaining that most consultation requests concern the resolution of conflict).
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ethics consultation might prove helpful. It also presents the different
approaches a clinical ethics consultant could take in assisting the pa-
tient and physician to resolve the dilemma.
B. An Illustrative Example
2
A fifty-seven-year-old woman is admitted to the hospital because of
a fractured hip. During her stay in the hospital, the woman's physi-
cian discovers that she has stage IA carcinoma of the cervix. Luckily,
because the cancer is caught early, it is almost certainly curable by a
hysterectomy. However, the patient refuses to have the surgery.
Based on the patient's "unreasonable" refusal to undergo surgery, the
treating physician believes that the woman is not mentally competent
to make decisions regarding her own care .29 The physician requests a
psychiatric consultation to confirm this belief. The psychiatric con-
sultant, however, does not agree that the patient is mentally incompe-
tent. At this point, the physician has three options. She can (1) seek
a court order to allow her to perform the surgery against the patient's
will, and probably save her life; (2) accept the competent patient's
autonomous decision, and discharge her "Against Medical Advice"; or
(3) attempt to resolve the disagreement between herself and the pa-
tient. Clearly, option three is preferable. In such a case, an ethics
consultation might help resolve the disagreement.
If a clinical ethicist were called to discuss the situation with the pa-
tient and physician, the consultation could take a number of forms.
Without commenting on what role the ethicist should play, which will
be discussed in Part II, the following are examples of how the consul-
tation could go.
First, a clinical ethicist could try in a neutral manner to elucidate
the reasoning behind the patient's and physician's respective convic-
tions, with the ultimate goal being a true consensus between the dis-
28 The following example is based on an actual, more detailed case, which was al-
tered slightly for simplicity. For the full story, see Ruth Faden & Alan Faden, False Belief
and the Refusal of Medical Treatment, 3 J. MED. ETHICS 130, 133-36 (1977), quoted in TOM
L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 92 (5th ed.
2001).
29 According to David Magnus, Director of Graduate Studies for the Center of
Bioethics at the University of Pennsylvania, "if your only reason for questioning the
patient's competency is that the patient does not agree with you, then you have mis-
framed the issue." Interview with David Magnus, Director of Graduate Studies, Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania Center for Bioethics, in Philadelphia, Pa. (Mar. 26, 2002). This is a
clear sign that an ethics consultation probably would be helpful because it could help
elucidate the true dilemma.
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agreeing parties. Second, the ethicist, after hearing each participant's
explanations, could tell the patient and physician what she thinks
should be done in the situation. This recommendation would not be
binding on the parties. Third, the ethicist could take the previous op-
tion a step further; instead of simply issuing a nonbinding recom-
mendation and providing an explanation for that recommendation,
the ethics consultant could actively try to convince the party opposed
to the proposal that it is the only ethically acceptable option. For ex-
ample, the clinical ethicist could stress the patient's right to make an
autonomous decision to refuse treatment, and then attempt to con-
vince the physician that the only ethical option is respecting the pa-
tient's wishes. Or, the ethicist could act as a physician-advocate, work-
ing with the physician to convince the patient that her position is
ethically unacceptable. In either case, a "consensus" might be
reached, though not through discussion and clarification, but
through coercion. Fourth, in rare circumstances, the ethicist could
issue a binding decision about what should be done.
II. WHAT SHOULD BE THE CLINICAL ETHICIST'S ROLE IN CASE
CONSULTATIONS?"
Judith Ahronheim, Jonathan Moreno, and Connie Zuckerman
note that "there is no single, universally accepted definition of clinical
ethics. ' '3 However, based on the definitions presented by leading fig-
ures in the field of bioethics, Ahronheim, Moreno, and Zuckerman
have formulated their own definition of clinical ethics:
[T]he systematic identification, analysis, and resolution of ethical prob-
lems associated with the care of particular patients. Its goals include
protecting the rights and interests of patients, assisting clinicians in ethi-
cal decision making, and encouraging cooperative relationships among
patients and those close to patients, clinicians, and health care institu-
tions.
30 David Casarett, Frona Daskal, and John Lantos explain that even though the
language of this discussion is often phrased in terms of the ethics consultant's "role,"
the fundamental question is about the ethics consultant's "moral authority." DavidJ.
Casarett et al., Expert in Ethics? The Authority of the Clinical Ethicist, HASTINGS CENTER
REP., Nov.-Dec. 1998, at 6, 6. For the sake of consistency with existing literature, I will
structure the discussion in terms of the clinical ethicist's role.
31 JUDITH C. AIRONHEIM, JONATHAN D. MORENO & CONNIE ZUcKERMAN, ETHICS
IN CLINICAL PRACTICE I (2d ed. 2000).
Id. at 2. Ahronheim, Moreno, and Zuckerman based their definition on the fol-
lowing authorities: ALBERT R. JONSEN El AL., CLINICAL ETHICS 1 (3d ed. 1992);
Fletcher, supra note 7, at 859 n.4; John La Puma, Clinical Ethics, Mission and Vision:
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Considering the many goals that can be ascribed to the practice of
clinical ethics, it should come as no surprise that exactly what the
clinical ethicist's role should be in case consultations is hotly de-
bated This debate is dependent on the assumption that the in-
volvement of clinical ethicists in individual cases is desirable.
A. Is the Involvement of Clinical Ethicists in Individual Cases Even
Desirable?
Many authors argue that the involvement of clinical ethicists in
individual cases is not desirable. Frank (Yeruham) Leavitt is one such
author. Leavitt cites three problems with consulting a clinical ethicist
about the appropriate treatment decision in specific cases."' First,
Leavitt is concerned with the possibility of a conflict of interest be-
cause clinical ethicists may be inclined to serve the interests of the in-
stitutions that employ them rather than the interests of the patients.
Second, Leavitt fears that physicians will shift the responsibility for
hard decisions to the clinical ethicists. Third, Leavitt thinks the con-
sultation of clinical ethicists "can be an excuse for ward staff not to
read biomedical ethics literature themselves and not to think deeply
about bioethical questions.
Scot Yoder would categorize Leavitt's main arguments against
clinical ethics consultation as "moral arguments" because they "do not
question the possibility of ethics expertise so much as the wisdom or
appropriateness of recognizing people as ethics experts."38 Another
Practical Wisdom in Health Care, 35 HosP. & HEALTH SERVICES ADMIN. 321, 321-26
(1990).
33 For example, nearly half of an entire issue of The American Journal of Bioethics was
devoted to discussion of "The Question of Method in Ethics Consultation." AM. J.
BIOETHics, Fall 2001, at 31, 31-59.
34 Frank (Yeruham) Leavitt, Letter to the Editor, Hospital Ethics Committees May Dis'-
courage Staff from Making Own Decisions, 321 BRIT. MED. J. 1414, 1414 (2000). Leavitt
believes the clinical ethicist's function should be mainly educational, "helping present
and future doctors and nurses to learn to think deeply, systematically[,] and for them-
selves about life, death, and their ethics." Id.
35 See id. ("[E]thicists ... who are hired or appointed by hospitals, national health




38 Scot D. Yoder, Experts in Ethics? The Nature of Ethical Expertise, HASTINGS CENTER
REP., Nov.-Dec. 1998, at 11, 12. Yoder explains that moral arguments "typically make
the claim either that ethics expertise is inconsistent with the tenets of liberal democ-
racy or that where ethical matters are concerned it would be dangerous to invest any-
one with the power and authority granted to an 'expert' or 'professional."' Id.
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"moral argument" against the necessity of clinical ethics consultations
would be that "men or women of conscience who thoughtfully apply
themselves to the moral problems faced in professional practice can
arrive at morally correct decisions.... [G]ood people generally pro-
duce good results. '1
Yoder also recognizes another type of argument against clinical
ethics consultations, which he refers to as "conceptual/empirical ar-
guments."4 These arguments raise questions about the possibility or
existence of ethics expertise, often making one of several claims: "that
ethics is not the sort of thing about which it is possible to have exper-
tise, that the methods employed by the so-called experts are funda-
mentally flawed, or that the empirical evidence does not support the
claim of expertise."" Most critics of consulting clinical ethicists make
both moral and conceptual/empirical arguments. Both types of ar-
guments are based on false assumptions and, hence, fail.
First, all three of Leavitt's arguments assume that the clinical ethi-
cist in a case consultation "deliver[s] 'right answers' to moral ques-
tions. However, as I will later argue, ethics consultants do not (or,
at least, should not) claim to know the best outcome.43 Rather, they
should facilitate consensus between the patient and the physician.44
Hence, Leavitt's objections to ethics consultation are critically flawed.
Specifically, there can be no conflict of interest between serving
the institution and serving the patient because the clinical ethicist is
not really "serving" either party. Instead, the ethics consultant is guid-
ing the patient and physician toward a common goal-moral consen-S41
sus-which is simultaneously in both of their interests. Also, physi-
cians cannot shift the responsibility for hard decisions to the clinical
ethicist because the clinical ethicist will not assume that responsibility.
In consensus building, the ultimate responsibility of reaching a mutu-
ally acceptable conclusion belongs to the active participants (patient
and physician), rather than the guide (ethicist). Finally, the process
39 Terrence F. Ackerman, The Role of an Ethicist in Health Care, in HEALTH CARE
ETHics 308, 309 (Gary R. Anderson & Valerie A. Glesnes-Anderson eds., 1987).
40 Yoder, supra note 38, at 12.
41 Id,
42 Ackerman, supra note 39, at 318.
43 Infta Part II.B.
44 Infra Part II.B.
4, SeeCasarett et al., supra note 30, at 7-9 (discussing the role of clinical ethicists as
facilitating consensus).
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of consensus building requires the physician's input and thereby
forces the physician to think deeply about bioethical questions.
Second, the objection that "morally conscientious persons are
thoroughly capable of resolving moral problems encountered in pro-
fessional practice without the assistance of specialists in ethics as-
sumes that people with "strong moral character" possess the tools
necessary "to assure satisfactory resolution of moral problems in clini-
cal practice. '7 In reality, though, clarification of values, identification
of alternative solutions, and assessment of their moral consequences"'
require skills that most physicians and patients do not have.0 This is
apparent from the heated debate about what skills are necessary to be
an effective clinical ethics consultant. It was also made apparent by a
task force formed by the Society for Health and Human Values and
the Society for Bioethics Consultation.
This task force composed a list of the core competencies clinical
ethics consultants should have.' The Task Force Report recognized that
"[t]he supplemental education or training that any person may need
to acquire a particular competency will be contingent on ... [her]
professional background, experience, and personal qualities, and...
the capacity in which [she] do[es] ethics consultation." , 2 This implies
that regardless of what level or type of additional training one might
need to "acquire a particular competency," some additional education
will be required for anyone wishing to be a clinical ethics consultant.
Therefore, one can infer that no physician would possess all of the
necessary skills, knowledge, and character traits to ensure an ethically
appropriate resolution to every morally problematic case she encoun-
ters.
46 Ackerman, supra note 39, at 319.
47 Id.
48 See id. (describing the process by which moral problems are resolved).
49 See Ackerman, supra note 16, at 46 (concluding that "the consensus [the goal of
ethics consultation] must be molded by persons who are thoroughly familiar with rele-
vant values, facts, options, and the consequences of their implementation").
50 See infra notes 150-57 and text accompanying notes 152-57 (discussing various
opinions about what skills one should possess to be a clinical ethicist).
SOC'Y FOR HEALTH & HUMAN VALUES-SOC'Y FOR BIOETHICS CONSULTATIONS,
CORE COMPETENCIES FOR HEALTH CARE ETHICS CONSULTANTS: THE REPORT OF THE
AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR BIOETHICS AND HUMANITIES 11-21 (1998) [hereinafter TASK
FORCE REPORT].
52 Aulisio et al., supra note 10, at 64 (summarizing the content of the Task Force
Report).
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Finally, the objection that "ethics is not the sort of thing about
which it is possible to have expertise "" misinterprets the very nature of
ethics consultation. Successful ethics consultation is not dependent
on a "systematic knowledge of right and wrong, 5 4 as successful medi-
cal consultation is dependent on a systematic knowledge of facts and
principles that can be applied to the case at hand to treat the patient.55
Rather, clinical ethicists rely on "a variety of conceptual resources in
providing clinical assistance 5 6 in order to facilitate a consensus be-
tween patients and physicians. A definitive conception of what is right
and wrong is not necessary to ensure that the patient and physician
come to a common understanding of what are ethically permissible
solutions to the problem at hand.
It seems clear, therefore, that clinical ethics consultations can be
quite useful when there are difficult issues to resolve-most notably,
disagreement between the physician and the patient regarding what
further action to take.
r13 Yoder, supra note 38, at 12.
54 Ackerman, supra note 39, at 318.
55 See id. at 308-09 (stating that clinical medical experts apply a "complex body of
knowledge" consisting of "widely accepted bodies of facts & principles" to make treat-
ment decisions). Critics that make this objection "seriously overestimate[] the degree
of systemization achieved in our scientific knowledge of medical practice." Id. at 318.
For example, there are a great number of illnesses for which patients receive many dif-
ferent treatments, depending not on income or what type of specialist they see, but
rather on what part of the country or in what hospital they are located. For a discus-
sion of variations in medical practice, see John E. Wennberg, Dealing with Medical Prac-
tice Variations: A Proposal for Action, 3 HEALTH AFr. 6 (1984). See also Mark R. Chassin et
al., Vaiations in the Use of Medical and Suigical Services by the Medicare Population, 314 NEW
ENG.J. MEL). 285, 287 (1986) (comparing the usage rates of certain procedures by pa-
tients sixty-five years old or older); John E. Wennberg et al., Professional Uncertainty and
the Problem of Supplier-1nduced Demand, 16 SOC. SCI. MEn. 811,812-17 (1982) (describing
variation in utilization with a specific study of surgical practices).
Ackerman, supra note 39, at 318.
See Robert D. Orr, Methods f Conflict Resolution at the Bedside, AM. I. BIOETHICS,
Fall 2001, at 45, 45 ("It has been my experience over the nearly [twenty] years I have
been doing bedside ethics consultations ... that the majority of ethics consultations
are requested for assistance in the resolution of conflict about further treatment."). In
fact, a recent study of hospital ethics committees revealed that the majority of consulta-
tion time is spent on three issues concerning treatment: "patient autonomy; the capac-
ity of patients to make their own health decisions; and ... miscommunication among
staff, clinicians and patients about the meaning and goals of treatment." Glenn
McGee, Arthur L. CaplanJoshua P. Spanogle & David A. Asch, A National Study of Eth-
ics Committees, AM.J. BIOETHICs, Fall 2001, at 60, 63.
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B. Two Views of What the Clinical Ethicist's Role Should Be in Case
Consultations
The heart of the 'debate is what exactly the clinical ethicist's role
should be in case consultations. Moreno identifies two models of
clinical ethics consultation. 59 The first, and less common, Moreno la-
bels the "hard" model. In this model, the ethics consultant acts like a
traditional clinician; she undertakes independent investigation of the
patient's medical and moral situation, which includes an examination
and interview of the patient and family, and then issues a recommen-
dation about what treatment she thinks is ethically appropriate .6 The
Judicial Council of the American Medical Association seems to prefer
the "hard" model of ethics consultation, but it makes clear that the
recommendations should not be, nor be considered, binding:
Ethics committees in health care institutions should be voluntary, educa-
tional, and advisory in purpose so as not to interfere with the primary re-
sponsibility and relationship between physicians and their patients....
The recommendations of the ethics committee should be offered pre-
cisely as recommendations imposing no obligation for acceptance on the
part of the institution, its governing board, medical staff, attending phy-
sician, or other persons.
Similarly, the American Hospital Association advises that "[a] n ethics
committee should not replace the traditional loci of decision making
on these issues. ' ' 62 However, supporting the "hard" model while simul-
taneously discounting the recommendation seems contradictory; the
recommendation is the major difference between the "hard" and
"soft" models. In essence, those making such an argument fail to rec-
ognize the apparent authority ethics consultants have when issuing
58 David Thomasma argues that "there is no one set of rules or one method that
can ever be articulated adequately." Thomasma, supra note 25, at 47. He reasons that
ethical consultations are dependent not only on "data about the patient's body and
course of disease," but also on "the spirit, the character, the conscience, the value
structures of human beings and societies [which] can never be wholly captured in any
set of rules and explicit methodology." Id.
. JONATHAN D. MORENO, DECIDING TOGETHER: BIOETHICS AND MORAL CON-
SENSUS 150-51 (1995).
CO Id. at 150.
61 Fleetwood & Unger, supra note 15, at 324 (omission in original) (quoting Judi-
cial Council, Am. Med. Ass'n, Guidelines For Ethics Committees in Health Care Institutions,
253JAMA 2698, 2699 (1985)).
62 Am. Hosp. Ass'n, Guidelines: Hospital Committees on Biomedical Ethics, in
HANDBOOK FOR HOSPITAL ETHICS COMMITTEES 110 (Judith Wilson Ross ed., 1986).
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recommendations, which ultimately negates the classification of the
recommendation as "nonbinding.'""
Advocates for the use of the second model,64 which Moreno calls
the "soft" model, agree that clinical ethicists should not make the final
decisions in the cases for which they are consulted . They go further,
though, arguing that the clinical ethicist should not even issue a rec-
ommendation, but rather should have a more impartial role in the
consultation process.
In the "soft" model, "the ethics consultant is largely a facilitator,
bringing together the relevant parties, helping to sort out the facts,
clarifying the problem at hand, raising important moral questions,
and noting useful distinctions."6" Although other authors do not use
Moreno's terms when discussing the issue, there is widespread agree-
ment that the "soft" method of consultation is the more desirable.
Physicians requesting an ethics consultation may want a practical,
definitive answer in the form of a recommended course of action,
rather than an evenhanded exploration and discussion of the oppos-
ing arguments concerning an issue. Such an approach, however,
63 See infra Part IV.B.4 (discussing the apparent authority a clinical ethicist has
when issuing a "recommendation").
64 Other models could theoretically be identified. For example, one model could
have the ethics consultant making the final decision in the case. One could also imag-
ine a model in which the clinical ethicist would attempt to convince either the patient
or physician that the ethicist's recommended course of action is the only ethically
permissible option. Since both of these "models" are really just extensions of the
"hard" model, they will not be further elaborated in this Comment. Robert Orr uses
the traditional methods of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) as models for discus-
sion of what role clinical ethicists should play in ethics consultation. Orr, supra note
57, at 45-46. Hence, the ADR method of arbitration would advocate the clinical ethi-
cist making a final, binding decision. However, Orr never claims arbitration is the best
method of ethics consultation. [d. In his analysis/comparison, Orr also recognizes a
fourth potential model of ethics consultation, in which the consultant would "enter[]
the conflict at the invitation of one of the parties with the express purpose of advanc-
ing that party's cause or position." Id. at 45. Of course, this model is based on the
ADR method of negotiation. Again, however, Orr never claims negotiation is the best
method of ethics consultation. Id. at 45-46. For a brief discussion of why this model is
inappropriate, see Ackerman, supra note 39, at 315-16.
See Ackerman, sup/ra note 16, at 46 ("Since justified moral commitments are so-
cially produced outcomes, the ethicist cannot know what is right independently of the
reflective contribution of other members of the moral community."); Ackerman, supra
note 39, at 314 ("The specialist in ethics cannot deliver 'right answers' to the moral
quandaries faced by health care administrators and clinical care providers."); James F.
Drane, -lifing a Hospital Ethicist, in ETHICS CONSULTATION IN HEALTH CARE, supra note
16, at 117, 127 ("[The ethicist] cannot dictate the right course of action. Mediation is
more important than direction.").
MORENO, supra note 59, at 150.
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"may infringe on the moral autonomy of those persons they are sup-
posed to serve." 67 According to Sigrid Fry-Revere, the belief that the
consultation process should result in a single correct decision is the
most serious problem with the current expectations of ethics consulta-
tions." Fry-Revere supports this conclusion by citing that "[t]he
common law .... the Constitution, and a considerable amount of
state statutory law protects an individual's right to make health care
decisions based on religious, cultural, and otherwise personal prefer-
ences."69 In fact, without reference to Moreno's classification, Fry-
Revere clearly distinguishes between the "soft" model and the "hard"
model:
The role of the bioethics services is not the same as the role of a medical
expert. A medical expert helps narrow down the medical options and
suggest one best course of action. A bioethics service should work to
maximize options and support the legal decisionmaker in whatever ethi-
cal perspective he or she chooses. The goal of bioethics consultation is
to present as many ethically acceptable options from as many different
ethical perspectives as possible. The value of a bioethics consultant is
primarily that he or she has studied and/or [has] experience in the
70types of decisions being made, not that he or she knows what is right.
So, Fry-Revere argues that the clinical ethicist should act as a guide
during the consultation, highlighting the important ethical issues that
need to be resolved but not offering solutions.
Besides the usurpation of the patient's decision-making authority,
other authors argue that "in a secular pluralist society" a final recom-
mendation by the clinical ethicist is inappropriate because "there
cannot be a privileged moral position or dominant moral view.
These authors maintain that the realities of moral and political life
demand that the moral claims of the patient be respected even when
they differ from those of the clinical ethicist and/or the physician.
In other words, the clinical ethicist must make sure that her role in
the ethics consultation is consistent with the fact that health care is as
pluralistic as any element of society, especially in an age of increased
concern for patient autonomy. The ethics consultation should be "a
forum for open discussion. .. where those who feel perplexed can
67 Fletcher & Hoffmann, supra note 18, at 336.
68 Sigrid Fry-Revere, Ethics Consultation: An Update on Accountability Issues,
PEDIATRIC NuRSING,Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 95, 96.
69 ld. at 96.
70 Id.
Casarett et al., supra note 30, at 7.
72 _
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come and express their doubts, fears, and uncertainties and where





It is important to note that although advocates of the "soft" model
do not support the clinical ethicist's issuing an ultimate recommenda-
tion, many of them do support the reaching of a consensus by the in-
volved parties. For example, George Annas criticized the ethics com-
mittee in the Baby K case74 because it "'seems to have discussed
nothing ethical at all ... it gave advice in medical practice and legal
strategy,' whereas it 'should have insisted that discussion with the
mother continue until a resolution was reached, and it should have
tried to facilitate that communication.' 75 David Casarett, Frona Das-
kal, and John Lantos argue that ethics consultants should only hand
down opinions "when the primary issue has been legally resolved or,
73 Fry-Revere, supra note 68, at 96.
74 In re Baby K, 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir. 1994). This case concerned a baby who was
born with anencephaly, a congenital defect where the brain stem is present but the
cerebral cortex is rudimentary or absent. Id. at 592. Although the physicians recom-
mended only providing the baby with nutrition, hydration, and warmth, the mother
insisted that the baby be given mechanical assistance when it developed trouble
breathing, and that the baby be resuscitated whenever necessary. Id. at 593. The
mother argued that, "as the Baby K's mother and sole guardian, she has the legal and
moral right to decide about medical treatment that is in the child's best interest."
Sandra Anderson Garcia, Sociocultural and Legal Implications of Creating and Sustaining
Life Through Biomedical Technology, 17 J. LEGAL MED. 469, 516 (1996). The hospital
sought a declaratory judgment that discontinuation of treatment would not violate any
laws. Baby K, 16 F.3d at 592. The court, however, denied the hospital's motion. Id.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's decision that the hospital
could not decline to provide stabilizing treatment to a baby with anencephaly if the
mother sought such treatment because such a refusal would violate the Emergency
Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2000). Baby
K, 16 F.3d at 598.
75 Calvin P. Leeman, John C. Fletcher, Edward M. Spencer & Sigrid Fry-Revere,
Quality Control for Hospitals' Clinical Ethics Services: Proposed Standards, 6 CAMBRIDGE Q.
HEALTHCARE ETHICS 257, 258 (1997) (quoting GeorgeJ. Annas, Asking the Courts to Set
the Standard of Emngency Care-The Case of Baby K, 330 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1542, 1543
(1994)); see also Ackerman, supra note 39, at 313-15 ("[T]he basic function of the spe-
cialist in ethics is to facilitate the process by which reflective resolution of moral prob-
lems can be achieved."); John La Puma & David L. Schiedermayer, Ethics Consultation:
Skills, Roles, and Training, 114 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 155-60 (1991) ("The consult-
ant [should act] as a rational, clear-headed participant who seeks to help disagreeing
parties come to morally permissible conclusions. More often than not, disagreeing
parties can agree on a practical solution, although their reasons for agreeing will be
different."), reprinted in NANcY S. JECKER, ALBERT R. JONSEN & ROBERT A. PEARLMAN,
BIOETHICs: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY, METHODS, AND PRACTICE 283, 287
(1997).
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to put it another way, when a national discourse has produced a con-
sensus that is then imposed by the state. 76
Similarly, the Society for Health and Human Values-Society for
Bioethics Consultation Task Force on Standards for Bioethics Consul-
tation concludes that the appropriate approach to clinical ethics,
which it calls the "ethics facilitation" approach, involves identifying
and analyzing the moral issue and facilitating the building of consen-
sus.77 More specifically, the clinical ethicist's role should be "to find
common ground among conflicting views by posing questions, sug-
gesting strategies, and helping participants to see their own positions
relative to those of the other participants., 78 The ethicist may suggest
a compromise between the parties, but she must be sure that the ar-
guments in favor of such a conclusion are convincing and ultimately
acceptable to all involved parties.79 Only if a consensus is reached can
the clinical ethicist be assured that the resolution of the disagreement
80has moral validity.
III. WHY IS THE LEGAL LIABILITY OF CLINICAL ETHICISTS EVEN AN
ISSUE?
According to Annas, "Good ethics committees begin where the
law ends."' If that is the case, though, then why do clinical ethicists
need to be concerned about potential legal liability? Since "[b]oth
law and ethics are ... normative and so aim to distinguish between ac-
ceptable and unacceptable behaviour by reflecting public opinion and
current mores, it would appear that if the clinical ethicist offered an
ethically permissible recommendation or facilitated an ethically per-
missible consensus, then her reco mmendation or facilitating action
would also be legal. It is clear, however, that "legal" and "ethical" are
not always synonymous. For example, "ethical actions may be legal or
illegal";13 although third trimester abortions (also called "partial-birth"
76 Casarett et al., supra note 30, at 7.
77 See Aulisio et al., supra note 10, at 61 (describing the "ethics facilitation" ap-
proach and explaining that the Task Force favored the that approach over both the
"authoritarian" and the "pure facilitation" approaches).
78 Casarett et al., supra note 30, at 9.
79 Id. at 8.
80 See id. (arguing that for a standard to be valid, it must be approved by all those
affected).
81 Annas, supra note 14, at 20-21.
82 Hendrick, supra note 21, at i50.
83 Susan M. Bauman, Clinical Ethics: What's Law Got to Do with It?, 8 ARCHIVES FAM.
MED. 345, 346 (1999).
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abortions) have been banned in approximately thirty states in this
countrys4 and are restricted in many other states,s85 even some who
would otherwise take a right-to-life stance might argue that abortion is
an ethical option when a fetus is discovered to have Down syndrome.
s
6
Similarly, "laws may be ethical or unethical,8 s as made apparent by
the success of the civil rights movement of the 1960s in abolishing un-
ethical segregation laws. These dichotomies are often attributed to
the fact that "law is a product of political haggling and compromise."9
It is important to recognize, however, that lawmakers'" "may be
seen as articulating the collective wisdom of our society (or at least, its
majority view)."'' Hence, the fact that liability is an issue for clinical
ethicists tells us something about what at least a majority of society
thinks about making ethical decisions in medicine. As Paul Wolpe
explains, "Pursuit of autonomy has become dominant in the American
model of medical decision making.' 5' As concern over patient auton-
omy has increased, "the acceptance of paternalism as appropriate in
medicine" has necessarily decreased* This lack of respect for author-
84 Sunny Kaplan, States Grapple with Late-Tern Abortion Bans, Stateline (Nov. 12,
1999), at http://www.stateline.org/story.do?storyld=51 486.
85 For a summary of various types of abortion laws throughout the country, see
Abortion Law Homepage, State Abortion Laws: A Survey, at http://members.aol.com/
abtrbng/stablw.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2002). 4
86 See, e.g., Noreen M. Clover & Samuel J. Glover, Ethical and Legal Issues Regarding
Selective Abortion of Fetuses with Down Syndrome, 34 MENTAL RETARDATION 207, 208
(1996) (citing Laura Hershey, Choosing Disability, MS., July-Aug. 1994, at 26, for the
proposition that "persons who otherwise describe themselves as pro-life advocates
may .... make exceptions based upon the health ('normality') of the fetus").
Bauman, supra note 83, at 346. The University of Pennsylvania would probably
disagree, though, as its motto, "leges sine moribus vanae," means "laws without morals
are worthless." Univ. of Pa., Office of Univ. Communications, Penn News: Frequently
Asked Questions, at http://www.upenn.edu/pennnews/faqs.html#nine (last visited Dec.
3,2002).
88 See AHRONHEIM, MORENO & ZUCKERMAN, supra note 31, at 10 ("[O]ften the law
is itself immoral. The civil rights movement of the 1960s rested on this premise ... .
89 Id.
00 The term "lawmakers" here refers not only to the politicians who literally write
laws, but also to judges who; through their actions interpreting the black-letter law,
create the common law.
W Bauman, supra note 83, at 345.
92 Paul Root Wolpe, The Triumph of Autonomy in American Bioethics: A Sociological
View, in BIOETHICS AND SOCIEiY: CONSTRUCTING THE ETHICAL ENTERPRISE 38, 46
(Raymond DeVries &Janardan Subedi eds., 1998).
l)onnie J. Self & Joy D. Skeel, Legal Liability and Clinical Ethics Consultations:
Practical and Philosophical Considerations, in MEDICAL ETHICS: A GUIDE FOR HEALTI
PROFESSIONALS 408, 414 (John F. Monagle & David C. Thomasma eds., 1988).
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ity has been cited as a cause of the increasingly litigious nature of so-
ciety.
94
Leaders of the community (i.e., those with higher education in
general, but especially those in positions of authority, like doctors,
lawyers, teachers, and clergy) used to be respected and trusted, such
that only gross violations of professionalism would incite a lawsuit.95
Now, however, "when anything is not completely satisfactory, the re-
sponse that comes to mind first (rather than last) is 'Sue for whatever
you can get.'" 96 Since patients no longer trust that their personal phy-
sicians will always do what is in their best interests, they certainly do
not trust that a clinical ethicist, whom they usually have not met or
even heard mention of before the consultation, will necessarily act in
their best interests.
Some argue that this change is due to the growing acceptance of
the idea that values are subjective, rather than objective.! That is,
they are relative to the person making the moral judgment, as op-
posed to relative to the circumstances.9 Donnie Self and Joy Skeel at-
tribute this change, in part, to the rise in popularity of existentialism
because "[t]he subjectivism of existentialism maintains that moral
judgments are merely expressions of emotions, preferences, or deci-
sions and do not make truth claims-and so cannot be true or false. ' ' ,a)
They explain existentialism in the following manner:
Existentialism explicates right and good in terms of freedom. It holds that
with respect to basic life-constituting decisions, one is completely free to
choose whatever lifestyle one pleases. No reason can be given for the
choice; and the choice cannot be wrong, for choice at this level defines
what is right.'0°
Therefore, according to Self and Skeel, though a stranger to our
modem American society, Albert Camus could be responsible for the
94 As stated by Self and Skeel, "Currently anyone can get sued for anything by any-
body." Id. at 410.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 412-14. But see Wolpe, supra note 92, at 43-46 (arguing that "[t]here is no
inherent reason that autonomy must become the primary ethical principle in a medi-
cal tradition," and concluding that the reason why pursuit of autonomy has become
dominant is "because its application is comparatively [to other popular principles]
straightforward and uncontroversial").
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plague of patient autonomy that is affecting the health care system to-
day.1
0'
Paternalism in medicine has also been affected by recent changes
that are wholly unrelated to patient autonomy. First, advances in
medical technologies have occurred at such a rapid pace that consen-
sus about what ethical canons should dictate their usage has never
really been formed.' Therefore, discussion of ethical concerns is
warranted, in fact desired, to ensure that the proper result is reached
in each particular instance. Second, "[p]ublic investment in the fi-
nancing of health care, in both governmental and non-governmental
arrangements, has generated a more sharply defined public interest in
the disposition of these [public] funds." 1 3 In other words, people
want to be sure that their financial contributions to the health care of
other people are being utilized in a fashion consistent with their con-
104ceptions of what is ethically appropriate. For example, if the gov-
ernment extended Medicare coverage to include physician-assisted
suicide, there would be great public outcry because everybody's tax
dollars contribute to the Medicare fund and not everyone considers
physician-assisted suicide to be ethically permissible.
Another reason, more particular to ethics consultation, for clinical
ethicists to be concerned about potential liability is well articulated by
William dePender and Wanda Ikeda-Chandler. They write:
Conflict and litigation are often a by-product of suspicion. Suspicion
grows when important concerns are ignored. Suspicion breeds fear.
Fear increases the possibility of misunderstanding. And the cycle con-
l{} Albert Camus was, beside Jean-Paul Sartre, the premier existentialist author.
12 See AHIRONIIEIM, MORENO & ZUCKERMAN, su/ra note 31, at 12 ("In recent
years,... modern medicine technologies have created familiar uncertainties about the
application of traditional ethical canons.").
103 Id.
104 One illustration of this increased concern for the ethical validity of ventures
undertaken with public funds is the debate surrounding President Bush's statements
on August 9, 2001 regarding public funding for stem cell research. For various argu-
ments in the debate on public funding for stem cell research, see Susan Baer, Senator-
Physician Backs Stem Cell Study; Frist Favors Funding Research on Embryos, BALT. SUN, July
19, 2001, at IA; Editorial, Ethics at Life's Threshold, OREGONIAN, July 13, 2001, at DI0;
Editorial, Federal Funds Should Be Used for Stem Cell Experimentation, PANTAGRAPIHI
(Bloomington, I1l.),July 22, 2001, at C2; Tim Friend, What Is at Stake?, CI-tI. SUN-TIMES,
Aug. 10, 2001, at 8; Helen Kennedy, Researchers Wary of Bush Stem Cell Ruling, DAILY
NEWS (N.Y.), Aug. 11, 2001, at 8; Editorial, No Funds for Stem Cell Research, WASH. TIMES,
July 11, 2001, at A16;Jaime Talan, Scientists Cautious on Limits to Work, NEWSDAY (N.Y.),
Aug. 11, 2001, at A6. Government money funds a multitude of medical research ven-
tures, but no other debate about the ethical permissibility of the research has occurred
in such a highly publicized form in the recent past.
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tinues. This cycle breaks out into public view when legal action is taken,
but the cycle itself isn't oroken.
If a clinical ethicist fails to communicate effectively with the partici-
pants in the consultation, those participants are more likely to be
suspicious of the entire process, and therefore of the consultant her-
self. This becomes more true as the role of the patient and/or physi-
cian in the consultation is increasingly minimized or marginalized.
As Candace Evans Blades and Michael Paul Curreri explain,
"Someone who feels as though they have had some control over the
decision-making process is more likely to be satisfied with a (clinical
ethicist] than someone who feels that he or she was somehow 'co-
erced' by a [clinical ethicist] into agreeing with a particular deci-
sion. '"'O This leads to the hypothesis that if a clinical ethicist wants to
decrease her exposure to potential liability, she should adhere to the
"soft" model of consultation and avoid making recommendations; if
patient and physician alike are satisfied with the process and outcome
of the consultation, they are not very likely to sue. This hypothesis will
be tested in the next Part where the potential liability is analyzed in
detail, and the "hard" and "soft" models are compared in this light.
IV. WHAT IS THE POTENTIAL (THEORETICAL) LEGAL LIABILITY OF A
CLINICAL ETHICIST?
As discussed above, patients are likely to sue when they are
harmed by a decision they feel was imposed upon them.'08 Therefore,
105 WILLIAM DEPENDER & WANDA IKEDA-CHANDLER, CLINICAL ETHICS: AN
INVITATION TO HEALING PROFESSIONALS 9 (1990).
106 For example, ineffective communication by the ethicist could lead to the pa-
tient and/or physician not understanding the other's views, or the patient and/or phy-
sician not understanding why the ethicist believes what she believes.
107 Candace Evans Blades & Michael Paul Curreri, Law, Ethics, and Health Care: An
Analysis of the Potential Legal Liability of Institutional Ethics Committees, [1989 Ed., Vol. 2,
Updates and Special Sections] BioLaw (Univ. Pub. Am.) S:317, S:319 (Dec. 1989); see
also Edmund G. Howe, When Physicians Impose Values on Patients: An Ethics Consultant's
Responsibilities, in ETHICS CONSULTATION IN HEALTH CARE, "supra note 16, at 137, 143-47
(arguing that an ethics consultant "should stress the existence and rationale of the
ethical consensus rather than his or her personal view" because physicians and patients
"will be less likely to perceive the consultant as attempting to impose his or her idio-
syncratic bias and more likely to focus on the reasoning behind that position," and
concluding that "the most effective ethics consultant will be the one who provides il-
lumination rather than persuasion").
108 If a physician is sued by a patient, the physician may turn and sue the clinical
ethicist in order to shift some or all of the blame. The doctor could argue that the
ethicist was negligent in her consultation, and that the physician's decision was influ-
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lawsuits are most likely to occur in cases where clinical ethicists are
authorized to make binding decisions. Lawsuits are also a potential
reality for ethics consultants who make "nonbinding" recommenda-
tions because although the recommendations are not explicitly im-
posed, they may be implicitly enforced because of the ethicists' appar-
ent moral authority.'09  This risk increases if the ethicist, though
offering a nonbinding recommendation, attempts to, and in fact does,
convince one of the two parties to acquiesce. In contrast, ethics con-
sultants who follow the "soft" model of consultation are much less
likely to have a lawsuit filed against them because both the patient and
the physician will have participated fully in the decision-making proc-
ess.
However likely or unlikely a lawsuit may be, nothing can really
stop an unhappy patient from filing suit against a clinical ethicist who
consulted the patient and her physician about a medical decision. As
I will show, the likelihood of actually being found liable for one's part
in an ethics consultation depends on the role played by the clinical
ethicist: the ethicist who issues a binding decision is most likely; she
who issues a nonbinding recommendation, but convinces the parties
to choose one option over another is somewhat likely; the ethicist who
simply issues a nonbinding recommendation is less likely; and finally,
the consultant who strictly adheres to the "soft" model of ethics con-
sultation is unlikely to be found liable for any intentional torts or neg-
ligent behavior.' 0
A. Intentional Torts
Theoretically, a clinical ethicist could be held civilly liable for a
number of intentional torts. At first glance, it would appear that since
clinical ethicists do not actually perform procedures on patients, a
theory of vicarious liability would be the only means of holding a
clinical ethicist liable for an intentional tort such as assault, battery, or
false imprisonment. However, the actions of a clinical ethicist in-
enced by the ethicist's erroneous guidance. The physician would also have to argue
that the clinical ethicist owed a particular duty to him. See infra Part IV.B (detailing the
legal elements of negligence).
109 See infra Part IV.B.4 (discussing the possibility and policy reasons for consider-
ing a nonbinding recommendation as sufficient proximate causation in a prima facie
case of negligence).
110 To be thorough, I did evaluate the potential for a clinical ethicist to be held
criminally liable for her role in an ethics consultation. However, since I found crimi-
nal liability to be extremely unlikely, I did not include the discussion in this Comment.
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volved in a case consultation could themselves be considered tortious,
such that she could be held directly liable for an intentional tort.
1. Vicarious Liability
"Vicarious liability" is defined as "[i]iability that a supervisory
party... bears for the actionable conduct of a subordinate or associ-
ate.., because of the relationship between the two..''. The most
common,12 and only potentially applicable, form of vicarious liability• 13
is the master-servant rule (respondeat superior).
The main requirement of the master-servant relationship is that
the master controls or has the right to control the conduct of the ser-
vant. 4 In order for liability to extend to the clinical ethicist, there-
fore, she would have to be able to control the conduct of the physi-
cian. 115 An ethicist who issues a binding decision clearly controls the
conduct of the physician, and hence, would be found vicariously liable
for the physician's tortious conduct under the master-servant rule. An
ethics consultant who merely convinces the parties to act in a certain
manner could also be found vicariously liable for the physician's tor-
tious act. A plaintiff's main obstacle in such a situation would be ac-
tually proving that the physician was, in fact, convinced and hence
controlled by the ethics consultant. However, an ethicist who issues a
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 377 (pocket ed. 1996).
112 See JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. ET AL., THE TORTS PROCESS 165 (4th ed. 1994)
("The central principle establishing vicarious liability for the tortious conduct of an-
other is [respondeat superior].").
113 For an excellent discussion of the legal doctrines courts have used to find vi-
carious liability in the health care context, see Sword v. NKC Hosps., Inc., 714 N.E.2d
142, 147-49 (Ind. 1999).
114 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (1958) (defining "servant"). The
other requirement is that the servant was acting in the scope of her employment, or, if
the servant was not acting within the scope of her employment:
(a) the master intended the conduct or the consequences, or (b) the master
was negligent or reckless, or (c) the conduct violated a non-delegable duty of
the master, or (d) the servant purported to act or to speak on behalf of the
principal and there was reliance upon apparent authority, or he was aided in
accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation.
Id. § 219. This requirement would be easy to meet because the physician's (i.e., ser-
vant's) actions in relation to the patient would clearly be within the scope of her em-
ployment.
15 The comment on subsection 1 of the Restatement section 220 specifically dis-
tinguishes between a servant, for whose conduct the master could be liable, and an in-
dependent contractor, for whose actions the master could not be liable. It states,
"Those rendering service but retaining control over the manner of doing it are not
servants." Id. § 220 cmt. e.
2002]
690 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYL VANIA LA W REVIEW
nonbinding recommendation, or no recommendation at all, does not
exercise control over the physician in charge of the patient's care.""
Therefore, the ethicist could not be considered the physician's mas-
ter, and could not be held liable under the master-servant rule for the
physician's tortious conduct.
Since no form of vicarious liability is applicable to the clinical
ethicist when issuing a nonbinding recommendation, some action of
the ethicist would have to be tortious in and of itself in order for her
to be found liable for an intentional tort.' 7 This is in contradistinc-
tion to the master-servant rule, under which the master is not liable
for any wrongful action of her own, but rather for the tortious acts of
someone acting on her behalf, someone over whom she exercises con-
trol. According to basic rules of tort law, one could be subject to li-
ability for an injury to another if her conduct that caused the harm "is
generally culpable and not justifiable under the circumstances .... al-
though the actor's conduct does not come within a traditional cate-
gory of tort liability.""" This general rule is applied in a variety of
ways. For instance, one could be liable for the tortious conduct of an-
other if the two were acting in concert'" or if one directed or permit-
ted the other to act in a tortious manner.120
2. Acting in Concert
As delineated by the Restatement (Second) of Torts, one could be
liable under the "acting in concert" rubric for the harm actually
caused by the tortious conduct of another in three circumstances.1
21
116 But see infra Part IV.B.4 (arguing that the ethicist may speak with such compel-
ling authority that the physician and/or patient are effectively left with no choice at
all). That line of reasoning, however, would lend support to the arguments offered
below that the clinical ethicist's acts of encouragement or advisement are themselves
tortious.
117 See Rowe v. Lewis, 632 F. Supp. 1397, 1402 (D. Mont. 1986) ("In the absence of
vicarious liability, plaintiff must allege some actions [of the defendants] to support a
claim against them.").
118 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870 (1979).
119 See id. § 876 (defining the liability for persons acting in concert).
120 See id. § 877 (defining the liability for a person directing or permitting the tor-
tious conduct of another).
121 Id. § 876. This theory of civil liability through "acting in concert" is similar to
"accomplice liability" in criminal law. Under the accomplice liability theory, the ac-
complice is guilty of the same substantive crime that she helped the principal perpetra-
tor to commit, even if she is not a "but for" cause of the event (she could simply en-
courage the commission of the crime). See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06 (1962)
(defining situations where a person is criminally liable for the conduct of another).
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The first situation is if one "does a tortious act in concert with the
[tortfeasor who actually caused the harm] or pursuant to a common
,122design with [that tortfeasor] ." This would not be applicable to the
clinical ethicist's situation because she would not have committed a
tortious act against the patient herself. The second situation is if one
"knows that the [harming tortfeasor's] conduct constitutes a breach of
duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so
to conduct himself., 12 3 Presumably, a clinical ethicist would not direct,
advise, or encourage a physician to commit an act that she knows is
tortious. In the unlikely instance that she did so, though, she could
be held liable for the resulting harm to the patient.
The last situation requires that the actor's "own conduct, sepa-
rately considered [from the conduct of the harming tortfeasorl, con-
stitutes a breach of duty to the third person.' 24 In other words, in or-
der for a clinical ethicist to be held liable for an intentional tort
committed by a physician under this theory of liability (1) she must
have had a duty to the patient, (2) she must have breached that duty,
and (3) her actions must have been "a substantial factor in causing the
[resultant harm]." 23  This is the standard for negligence' There-
fore, if a clinical ethicist were found negligent,12 1 she could also be
held liable for any foreseeable intentional tort committed by the
physician. Presumably, a clinical ethicist would make clear to a physi-
cian that the physician should not commit a foreseeable tortious act.
However, in the unlikely instance that the ethics consultant did not do
so, she could be held liable for the resulting harm to the patient.
3. Directing or Permitting Conduct
As section 877 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts explains, one
may be held liable for the tortious conduct of another if he "orders or
induces the conduct, [or] if he knows or should know of circum-
122 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(a) (1979).
123 Id. § 876(b).
124 Id. § 876(c).
12I d. § 876 cmt. e.
126 See infra Part IV.B (stating the required elements of negligence).
127 For an analysis of the clinical ethicist's potential liability under a theory of neg-
ligence, see infra Part IV.B.
128 The actor must have had "reason to know" that the harmer would act in such a
tortious manner. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 cmt. e, illus. 12-14
(1979) (presenting situations where a reasonable belief that an act was not tortious ne-
gates liability).
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stances that would make the conduct tortious if it were his own."'2 ' Al-
though this sounds like a theory of vicarious liability, in fact the act of
ordering or inducing the conduct is itself what is considered tor-
tious.'"' Even though the ethicist did not personally touch the patient,
it would be sufficient for a finding of liability that the ethicist intended
the conduct or its consequences, and persuaded another to engage in
such conduct.1" ' For example, if A intends to touch B without B's
permission but does not intend to harm B, the fact that A intends to
touch B without her permission and that B is harmed is sufficient to
make A liable to B for battery."132 Even if no physical harm to B occurs,
A is liable to B for battery if the contact is "offensive."' This theory of
liability could be applicable to three of the four possible consultation
formats discussed in Part II.B.
a. Ethicist issuing a binding decision
Most clearly, if a clinical ethicist issues a binding decision, she will
be found liable for an intentional tort committed by the physician be-
cause the ethicist will have "ordered" the tortious conduct. For exam-
ple, if a clinical ethicist involved in the example provided in Part I.B
ordered the physician to ignore the patient's objections, restrain her,
and perform the hysterectomy, the ethicist would clearly be liable for
the resulting intentional torts (assault, battery, and false imprison-
ment).
b. Ethicist issuing a nonbinding recommendation, but convincing the parties
to accept hei proposal
If a clinical ethicist issues a nonbinding recommendation, but
then also attempts to persuade either the physician or patient to ac-
cept her proposal, she could be found liable for an intentional tort
committed by the physician. In a suit arising from this situation, the
plaintiff (either patient or physician) would have to prove that the
129 Id. § 877(a).
1.0 In the comment on this clause, the Restatement reads, "In many of the situa-
tions that would come within the rule stated in this Clause, the person giving the order
or inducement would be liable on the ground that he was principal or master; the rule,
however, is independent of the existence of liability on this ground." Id. § 877 cmt. a.
]:; See id. § 870 cmt. b ("For certain early developing torts, such as assault, battery
and false imprisonment, it is held not to be necessary to intend to harm the plaintiff,
but intent to commit the tort (or a similar one) on a third person is sufficient.").
132 See id. § 13 (defining battery for harmful contact).
13 See id. § 18 (defining battery for offensive contact).
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physician would have acted differently if the ethicist had not made the
particular recommendation.1 3 4 This would satisfy the "inducement"
requirement. In a situation where the ethicist convinced the patient
to "consent" to the procedure, the ethicist could argue that the pa-
tient's "consent" made the act privileged, thereby barring the patient's135
recovery. In order to defeat this defense, the plaintiff would have to
prove that the patient's acquiescence was not true consent (i.e., it was
coerced or it was not fully informed), and therefore did not confer a
privilege to the contact.
So, for example, if a clinical ethicist involved in the example pro-
vided in Part I.B issued a nonbinding recommendation, but then con-
vinced the patient to undergo the surgery, the ethicist could be liable
for the resulting intentional torts (assault, battery, and false impris-
onment) if the plaintiff could prove that (1) the physician would not
have performed the hysterectomy if the ethicist had not tried to per-
suade her, and (2) the patient only "consented" because she was co-
erced.
c. Ethicist issuing nonbinding recommendation
If a clinical ethicist issues a nonbinding recommendation, it is un-
likely that she will be found liable for an intentional tort committed by
a physician, but it is possible. The requirements for holding an ethi-
cist liable in such a situation are the same as those required when the
ethicist attempts to convince the parties to pursue one option over
another.' In this situation, however, the plaintiff would have a much
more difficult time proving both "inducement" and "coercion" be-
cause the ethicist made no active attempts to persuade either the pa-
tient or physician.
d. Ethicist facilitating consensus, with no recommendation
If a clinical ethicist simply facilitated true consensus between the
patient and physician, the ethicist could not be found liable for the
tortious acts of the physician. First, as mentioned previously, if both
the patient and physician are satisfied with the process and outcome
134 For a discussion of causation, which relates to the argument by a physician or
patient that the ethicist's recommendation persuaded the physician's conduct, see in-
fra Part IV.B.4.
See HENDERSON ET AL., supra note 112, at 34-59 (explaining how consent pro-
duces a privilege to inflict contact, which defeats a plaintiffs prima facie case).
136 Supra Part 1V.A.3.b.
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of the consultation, they are not very likely to sue.137 However, if a
true consensus supported the committing of a tortious act, and one of
the parties sued, the clinical ethicist would be able to successfully de-
fend the suit by arguing that the patient's consent made the act privi-
leged. The plaintiff would be unable to prove that the patient was co-
erced into "consent" by the ethicist because the ethicist would not
have expressed an opinion of her own.
B. Negligence
If legal action were ever brought against a clinical ethicist, it
would most likely be in the form of a civil suit for negligence. Negli-
gence is defined as "[t]he failure to exercise the standard of care that
a reasonably prudent person would have exercised in the same situa-
tion.""" Therefore, in order to be found negligent, four essential
elements must exist: duty, breach of duty, causation, and harm (or
damages). '" In nonlegal terms, this means that for someone to be
found negligent and therefore liable for damages to another person,
the following conditions must exist: (1) the person who caused the
harm must have had a duty to act in a reasonable manner (i.e., ac-
cording to a specific standard of care) toward the harmed; (2) the
person who caused the harm must have breached that duty (i.e., the
person who caused the harm did not act according to that standard of
care); (3) the harmed must have, in fact, been harmed; and (4) the
actions of the person who caused the harm (or lack of action by that
person) must have been the actual and proximate cause of the harm
to the harmed.
1. Duty
It is not absolutely clear that the first element of negligence, the
existence of a duty to the patient, would be present in the case of a
clinical ethicist case consultation. It is often debated whether the duty
of the ethicist is to the patient or to the physician. Some authors ar-
gue that since the physician is usually the one who calls for the ethics
consultation, the physician is the client of the clinical ethicist, and
therefore, the ethicist's duty is to the physician. Self and Skeel make
such an argument, maintaining that "if traditional understanding of
1'3 Supra Part I!1.
18 BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 434 (pocket ed. 1996).
139 Id.
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consultations in the medical setting is applied to ethics consultations,
then clearly the client or recipient of the efforts of a clinical ethicist is
the physician." 40
Andrew Merritt disagrees. He states, 'Just as a consulting physi-
cian owes a duty of care to the patient even if he or she does not meet
directly with the patient, [clinical ethicists] should owe a duty of care
to patients whenever they are consulted to further the interests of
those patients."141 In fact, Merritt argues that some consider the clini-
cal ethics consultant to be a "champion of the patient's interests, safe-
guarding the patient from the competing interests of the hospital or
the medical staff.'', 4  Gordon Duval does not go that far, but argues
that it is conceivable that a court would find the clinical ethicist to be
in a "fiduciary relationship to the patient who is the subject of his ad-
vice. , 4 3 Duval defines a fiduciary relationship as "one of trust and de-
pendence that in the medical context imposes upon the medical prac-
titioner a family of particular obligations to patients, including those
of utmost good faith and loyalty, honesty, respect for confidential in-
formation, and an obligation to act in the patient's best interests."
44
Yet, others simply argue that if the clinical ethicist owes no conflicting
duty to others, her obligation may be found to run to the patient.
45
There are critics, however, who believe that "the consultant works
for both the physician and the patient.'' 4  This concept opens the
door for double liability-first to the patient and then to the doctor
on behalf of the patient. It seems likely that a court would find that
an ethics consultant owes a duty to the patient to act in a reasonable
fashion because the potential harm to the patient is clearly foresee-
able. Similarly, a court would probably find that a clinical ethicist also
owes a duty to the physician to perform a consultation in a nonnegli-
gent manner.
140 Self & Skeel, supra note 93, at 409.
41 Merritt, supra note 3, at 1283.
42 Id. But see Ackerman, supra note 39, at 315 (arguing that "ascribing a 'patient
advocate' role to the consulting ethicist" is inappropriate).
143 Gordon Duval, Liability of Ethics Consultants: A Case Analysis, 6 CAMBRIDGE Q.
HEALTHCARE ETHICS 269, 272 (1997); see also Laurence B. McCullough, The Histoy of
Medical Ethics Is Crucialfor a Critical Perspective in the Continuing Development of Ethics Con-
sultation, AM.J. BIOETHICS, Fall 2001, at 55, 56 (reasoning that the history of medical
ethics supports the ethics consultant being a fiduciary of the patient).
144 Duval, supra note 143, at 272.
145 Blades & Curreri, supra note 107, at 320.
146 La Puma & Schiedermayer, supra note 75, at 288.
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But does a clinical ethicist who was involved in a case consultation
have a duty to protect the patient when the doctor chooses a course of
action which is contrary to the ethicist's recommendations and which
the ethicist believes will harm the patient? John Robertson argues
that
courts would probably find that if [a medical] consultant was clearly
aware of improper management that would harm the patient, it would
be his or her duty to protect the patient [because by] agreeing to advise
the physician about this case, he or she takes on a duty to act for the pa-
tient's best interests.
147
Since a medical consultant has such a duty, there is no good reason
why the clinical ethicist should be treated differently. 41 It should be
made clear, however, that the evidence of harm and the need for in-
tervention would have to be clear and strong for the courts to recog-
nize and impose this additional duty." '
2. Breach of Duty
The second element of negligence, that the clinical ethicist
breached her duty to the patient, is also problematic in the case of a
clinical ethicist involved in case consultation. The reason for this dif-
ficulty is that there is no universally agreed-upon standard for what
skills one needs to possess in order to be qualified to act as a clinical
ethicist.50' In fact, it is one of the most debated issues concerning
clinical ethics-everyone seems to have an opinion about what that
standard should be. 5' The most comprehensive articulation of the
core competencies clinical ethics consultants should possess comes
from a task force formed by the Society for Health and Human Values
and the Society for Bioethics Consultation.' The Task Force Report
147 John A. Robertson, Clinical Medical Ethics and the Law: The Rights and Duties of
Ethics Consultants, in ETHICS CONSULTATION IN HEALTH CARE, supra note 16, at 157,
169.
I" Id. at 169.
149 id.
150 For discussions of what skills a clinical ethics consultant should possess, see
MORENO, supra note 59, at 152; Aulisio et al., supra note 10, at 61-64; Duval, supra note
143, at 272-75; Fry-Revere, supra note 68, it 96; La Puma & Schiedermayer, supra note
75, at 289.
151 See sources cited supnra note 150 (presenting differing opinions concerning the
capabilities necessary to be a clinical ethics consultant).
152 TASK FORCE REI'ORT, sipra note 51, at 11-21; see aLho Aulisio et al., supra note 10,
at 61 (writing a position paper for the Task Force, summarizing and discussing these
core competencies). The American Society for Bioethics and Humanities (ASBH)
[Vol. 151: 667
LEGAL LIABILITY OF CLINICAL ETHICISTS
lists skills in assessment,153 process,' and interpersonal relations;'
5
knowledge in nine specific areas; '' and eight character traitsI57 as es-
sential for a clinical ethicist. Skills, areas of knowledge, and character
traits listed by other authors, though worded differently, generally fit
into the categories delineated by the Task Force.
The breach of duty requirement is also difficult to interpret in the
case of a clinical ethicist because "the effective practice of ethics con-
sultation might depend as much or more on the institutional or social
circumstances of the consultation," than on the "qualifications of the
ethics consultant."'' 1 8 Evaluation of these social or institutional cir-
cumstances is not only more difficult, but it would also shift the focus
from the individual ethicist and her actions to forces outside her con-
trol (e.g., the participants' expectations of the consultant, or the insti-
tution's perception and treatment of ethics consultations generally).
This would also effectively shift the blame from the individual ethicist,
whom the court could hold responsible for the outcome, to indeter-
minate systematic and structural processes, which would leave the
plaintiff without effective recourse. However, in fairness to the clini-
cal ethicist, a court would probably have to consider these factors
later adopted the Task Force Report. Id. at 59.
153 Some examples of ethical assessment skills, as provided by Aulisio et al., are
"the ability to distinguish the ethical dimensions of the case from other, often overlap-
ping dimensions (such as legal, medical, and psychiatric aspects), and the ability to
identify and justify a range of morally acceptable options and their consequences."
Aulisio et al., supra note 10, at 61.
154 Facilitation is one example of a process skill. Id.
155 Since "ethics consultations often revolve around communication occlusions of
various sorts," George J. Agich, The Question of Method in Ethics Consultation, AM. J.
BIOETHics, Fall 2001, at 31, 35, interpersonal skills are probably the most crucial com-
petencies for a clinical ethicist to possess. Two obvious, but important, illustrations of
these skills are "the ability to listen well and communicate interest, respect, support,
and empathy to involved parties and the ability to represent the views of involved par-
ties to others." Aulisio et al., supra note 10, at 61.
156 Specifically, these nine areas are
moral reasoning and ethical theory, bioethical issues and concepts, health
care systems, clinical context, knowledge of the local health care institution in
which consultation is done, the local health care institution's relevant policies,
beliefs and perspectives of patient and staff population, relevant codes of eth-
ics and professional conduct and guidelines of accrediting organizations, and
relevant health law.
Aulisio et al., supra note 10, at 61-62.
157 The eight character traits specifically mentioned by the Task Force are "toler-
ance, patience, compassion, honesty, courage, prudence, humility, and integrity." Id.
at 64.
158 Agich, supra note 155, at 36.
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when determining whether or not the ethicist breached her duty to
the patient.
Duval provides another slightly problematic view of what would
entail a breach of duty. He explains that "[c]ourts tend to accept as
nonnegligent and therefore not giving rise to liability professional
practices that are accepted by at least a reasonably substantial and
authoritative segment of the profession.', 1 9  However, it is unclear
whether or not clinical ethics consultation should be considered a
"profession."'60 Additionally, even if clinical ethics consultation is con-
sidered a profession, it is not clear exactly who is a member of this
"profession."'6 ' Therefore, it is not clear whom would be called before
a court to testify as to the appropriate standard of care of the clinical
ethicist. In fact, many courts have been reluctant to recognize clinical
ethicists (or bioethicists, in general) as experts.""
There does appear to be a resolution to this problem, though. It
has been argued that
[s]ince there is not an obviously right or wrong answer in many ethical
problems, the defense of error ofjudgment may be invoked. What is in-
volved is not a lack of skill so much as an exercise of the health care
ethicist'sjudgment at the relevant time, and the court ma, be reluctant
to say that choosing a certain ethical option was negligent.
Therefore, even without a clearly established standard of care for the
clinical ethicist in a case consultation, if the clinical ethicist "acted in
good faith, with due care, without malice, and in conformity with
thoughtful procedures and thorough investigation of facts, and [her]
159 Duval, supra note 143, at 275.
, C See WesleyJ. Smith, The Question of Method in Ethics Consultation: Transforming a
Career into a Profession?, AM.J. BIOETHICS, Fall 2001, at 42, 42-43 ("[Ethics consultants]
cannot be transformed into medical professionals by promulgating rules and methods
to direct their activities.... [I]n the end the future of ethics consultation is self-
limiting.").
See sulsa notes 150-51 and accompanying text (explaining that there is no
agreed-upon standard for who is qualified to act as a clinical ethicist).
162 This is a widely debated issue, to which I cannot do justice in this Comment of
limited focus. For discussions of this issue, see Alexander Morgan Capron, Facts, Val-
ues, and Expert Testimony, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Sept.-Oct. 1993, at 26; John C.
Fletcher, Bioethics in a Legal Forum: Confessions of an "Expert" Witness, 22J. MED. & PHIL.
297 (1997); Virginia A. Sharpe & Edmund Pellegrino, MedicalEthics in the Courtroom: A
Reappraisal, 22J. MED. & PHIL. 373 (1997); Bethany Spielman & George Agich, The Eu-
ture of Bioethics Testimony: Guidelines for Determining Qualifications, Reliability and Helpful-
ness, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1043 (1999).
163 Larry Lowenstein & Jeanne DesBrisay, Liability of Health Care Ethics Consultants,
in THE HEALTH CARE ETHICS CONSULTANT 133, 148 (Francoise E. Baylis ed., 1991).
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conclusions and recommendations were reasonably warranted,' ' 4 she
will probably not be found to have breached her duty to the patient.
If there comes a time when the standard of care includes the ethi-
cist's not issuing a recommendation (because recommendations are• x 161
considered too influential) , issuance of a recommendation could be
considered a breach of the ethicist's duty. The standard of care that
would likely be prescribed by a court today, however, could potentially
be satisfied (or not satisfied) by a clinical ethicist who performed a
consultation in any of the four discussed formats.
6
3. Harm
Harm is usually the most straightforward element of negligence in
medical cases. 6 However, since harm is completely case specific, it is
difficult to discuss in an abstract manner. Additionally, even in cases
where determination of harm is complicated, it is not affected by the
fact that a clinical ethicist participated in the decision-making process.
Clearly, then, harm is also not affected by the format of ethics consul-
tation the ethicist employed. For the foregoing reasons, harm will not
be discussed further in this Comment.
4. Causation
Causation of the harm, on the other hand, is probably the most
complicated element to prove in a case involving a clinical ethicist
case consultation. In order to be found liable, the defendant's negli-
gence must have been the actual and proximate cause of the harm.
"Proximate cause" is defined as "[a] cause that directly produces an
event and without which the event would not have occurred.' ' 68 Un-
like the other three, previously discussed elements required for a find-
164 ROSS ET AL., supra note 3, at 141.
15 See infra Part IV.B.4.b (discussing how influential an ethicist's "nonbinding"
recommendation may be).
:66 See supra Part I.B (delineating four possible formats for an ethics consultation).
67 One could ask, however, should the law recognize ethical harm? For instance,
if there was a situation in which a patient changed her mind about undergoing a pro-
cedure, and then learned that the procedure was not medically necessary, could that
patient successfully sue on the basis of "ethical harm," even if there was no physical
harm? Chances are, what might be considered "ethical harm" would probably be con-
sidered when calculating mental and emotional harm.
168 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY87 (pocket ed. 1996).
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ing of negligence, the analysis of causation does differ depending on
the format of ethics consultation employed by the ethicist. 6 9
a. Ethicist issuing binding decision
Assuming it is proved that the patient's harm resulted from the
medical procedure, the binding decision of a clinical ethicist would
clearly be the actual and proximate cause of the harm that resulted.
b. Ethicist issuing nonbinding recommendation
At first glance, it might seem unlikely that a recommendation by
an ethics consultant could be considered the proximate cause of any
harm suffered by a patient because of the presence of an intervening,
free-willing actor. In other words, since the physician and/or the. pa-
tient makes the final decision with no duty to follow the recommenda-
tion of the clinical ethicist, the clinical ethicist should not be consid-
ered the proximate cause of the harm. Society has always expected
physicians to take responsibility for the final treatment decisions, de-
spite any outside pressures from institutions, insurance companies,• 170
HMOs, or ethics committees.
Some argue, however, that it would be plausible for a court to find
that the clinical ethicist speaks with such compelling authority that
her recommendation "may place such a heavy burden on those who
consult them to follow [her] advice or to come up with very good rea-
sons why those recommendations should not be followed," that those
seeking consultation may realistically have no choice at all.' 7' After all,
a physician or patient will not approach a clinical ethicist if she does
not trust the ethicist's skills and experience in dealing with matters
similar to the one at hand (unless the physician is mandated to do so
in this instance by the institution, either because of institutional policy
172or a patient request). . Hence, it should be expected that the physi-
cian or patient would treat the "nonbinding" recommendation of the
clinical ethicist as, "if not binding, at least highly persuasive, in much
:69 See supra Part I.B (delineating four possible formats for an ethics consultation).
170 Fleetwood & Unger, supra note 15, at 323.
171 Ross FT AL., supra note 3, at 135; see also George Agich, Authority in Ethics Con-
sultation, 23J.L. MED. & ETHIcs 273, 275 (1995) (arguing that because ethics consult-
ants are perceived as having authority their recommendations have "a practical effect
akin to power").
172 Duval, supra note 143, at 276.
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the same way as a medical consult.' 7' One reason for this might be
that if a patient and her family feel like they are receiving a "fair hear-
ing" for the first time in the medical experience, they may be so grate-
ful that their opinions are finally being considered that they may be
unable to think clearly for themselves. 74 This is equally true .when a
physician is enmeshed in a complex case because, as George Agich
points out, "involvement by the ethics consultant who confirms the
difficult nature of the case might lead to effacement of the physician's
own independent critical judgment.'17
Unfortunately, it is often impossible to know what the physician
and patient would have done had they not consulted the ethicist or,
more importantly, if the recommendation had been other than what
it was. In other words, it is difficult to discern whether the ethicist's
recommendation was actually a "but for" or proximate cause of the, fi-
nal decision and, hence, the harm. However, ,considering the facts
that many physicians perceive clinical ethicists as encroaching on their
decision-making authority, and patients are sometimes reluctant to
trust a "specialist" with Whom they have no prior history, it seems
pretty clear that the physician or patient would not consult a clinical
ethicist if the ethicist's views were not expected .to play a significant
role in the treatment decision. Therefore, it could be inferred from
the mere fact that the ethicist-was consulted that her recommendation
influenced the final decision and hence was a proximate cause of the
harm.
Some argue that in addition to the superior moral authority the
clinical ethicist appears to have over the physician and patient, there
are institutional factors that contribute to the physician's feeling an
obligation to follow the recommendation of the clinical ethicist. As
Laurence McCullough writes, "Power is gathering to ethics consultants
as a result of growing organizational sanction .... "'.7 Merritt explains
this point further, writing, "Because the ethics [consultation] is estab-
173 Id.; see also BOWEN HOSFORD, BIOETHICS COMMITTEES: THE HEALTH CARE
PROVIDER'S GUIDE 94 (1986) ("It is inescapable that a bioethics committee will influ-
ence physicians' decisions, however.... Though they ordinarily.., do not write rec-
ommendations on patients' charts, their comments will be influential.").
74 Agich, supra note 171, at 275.
75 Id.
176 See HOSFORD, supra note 173, at 93 (quoting a philosopher who serves on three
bioethics committees, who says: "'We spend a lot of time reassuring physicians that the
committee is not in there to tread on their turf-to intrude on their decision-making
authority."').
177 McCullough, supra note 143, at 56.
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lished as a formal structure for guiding the decision-making process, it
would be difficult to argue that the [ethicist's] advice is not a substan-
tial factor in the ultimate determination of a doctor to follow that ad-
,,178vice. In fact, the clinical ethicist may be viewed as the "conscience
of the institution.'"179 This idea may be due, in part, to the famous In re
Quinlan decision."0
In Quinlan, the NewJersey Supreme Court ruled that:
If [the hospital ethics committee] agrees that there is no reasonable pos-
sibility of [the patient's] ever emerging from her present comatose con-
dition . . . the present life-support system may be withdrawn and said ac-
tion shall be without any civil or criminal liability, therefor, on the part
of any participant, whether guardian, physician, hospital or others.
In other words, "compliance with the recommendation of the 'ethics
committee' shielded the health care professionals and the hospital
from liability."'8 Since Quinlan, many cases have forced the courts to
consider the recommendations of clinical ethicists,'8 ' and the author-
ity accorded to these recommendations has varied considerably.14 But
since none of these cases has been as well known as Quinlan, physi-
cians may not be aware that courts do not consistently consider clini-
cal ethicists to be the "conscience of society.
18
5
In sum, the apparent support from the courts and the institution
for the clinical ethicist's recommendation, as well as the decision
maker's personal feeling that she has inferior moral authority, could
178 Merritt, supra note 3, at 1275.
171ROSS ETAL., supra note 3, at 135.
180 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
181 Id. at 672.
182 Fleetwood & Unger, supra note 15, at 322.
183 See, e.g., In re L.H.R., 321 S.E.2d 716, 723 (Ga. 1984) (holding that an ethics
committee could, but need not be consulted in the present circumstances, since the
state had no compelling interest in maintaining the life of a terminally ill infant); Su-
perintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 434 (Mass. 1977) (rejecting
"the approach adopted by the New Jersey Supreme Court in the Quinlan case of en-
trusting the decision whether to continue artificial life support to the patient's guard-
ian, family, attending doctors, and hospital 'ethics committee"'); In re Torres, 357
N.W.2d 332, 336-37 (Minn. 1984) (using the reports of hospital ethics committees as
evidence to evaluate the validity of the decision to remove life support); see also Fleet-
wood & Unger, supra note 15, at 322 (discussing these three cases).
184 See Fleetwood & Unger, supra note 15, at 322 (discussing In re L.H.R, In re Tor-
res, and Saikewicz, and the different levels of authority accorded to the ethics committee
recommendations in those cases).
185 This point is exemplified by the common misconception that "[p]hysicians are
in less legal danger when they consult bioethics committee members than when they
make decisions privately." HOSFORD, supra note 173, at 88.
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lead a physician or patient to feel that she has no choice but to follow
the "nonbinding" recommendation of the clinical ethicist. If a court
were to accept this argument, the causal link between the clinical
ethicist's "nonbinding" recommendation and the harm to the patient
would be established.
c. Ethicist issuing nonbinding recommendation, but convincing the parties to
accept her proposal
If it is possible for a clinical ethicist who simply issues a nonbind-
ing recommendation to be considered the actual and proximate cause
of the harm, as I argue above, then a clinical ethicist who goes one
step further and convinces the parties to accept her proposal could
clearly be found to be the actual and proximate cause of the harm;
the plaintiffs argument that the ultimate decision would have been
different had it not been for the actions of the clinical ethicist is
stronger when the ethicist actively attempts to persuade either the pa-
tient or the physician.
d. Ethicist facilitating consensus, with no recommendation
As difficult as proving causation is when the ethicist issues a rec-
ommendation, it is considerably harder when the ethicist does not is-
sue a recommendation, but rather simply facilitates a consensus be-
tween the parties involved. In order for causation to be found, the
failure of the ethicist to adequately perform the consultation task (i.e.,
no consensus was reached) would have to result in the implementa-
tion of an ethically impermissible option, which then caused harm to
the patient. If the option was ethically permissible, though medically
incorrect in those circumstances, the ethicist's actions (or inaction, as
it may be) could not be considered a cause because she is not a medi-
cal expert. The ethicist's only goal in consultation is to ensure that
the decision reached is ethically appropriate." 7 Hence, only if an
ethicist allows an ethically impermissible outcome to the consultation,
which causes harm to the patient, can the ethicist's actions be consid-
ered a legal cause of the harm. For such an instance to arise, the
clinical ethicist would have to be grossly negligent-an extremely un-
likely but not impossible occurrence.
186 See supra Part IV.A.3.b-c (discussing possible intentional tort liability for ethi-
cists issuing nonbinding recommendations).
187 See Casarett et al., supra note 30, at 8-9 (arguing that "[t]he challenge for the
ethics consultant is to determine when... a conclusion has moral validity").
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C. What Should Be a Clinical Ethicist's Role in Case Consultations if She
Wants to Limit Exposure to Liability?
It is clear from the discussion concerning potential, theoretical li-
ability for clinical ethicists involved in case consultations that ethics
consultants who refrain from issuing recommendations are signifi-
candy less likely to be held liable for harm to a patient that'may sub-
sequently result. Therefore, if clinical ethicists want to reduce their
exposure to potential liability, they should adhere to the "soft" model
of consultation and avoid making recommendations."" This is not to
say that the ethicist should be a passive participant in the consultation
process. Rather, she should actively guide the discussion, ensuring
(1) that the patient and physician are both given the opportunity to
explain their respective positions, and (2) that issues crucial for an ac-
ceptable outcome, yet previously unidentified by the participants, are
raised and adequately discussed. The ethicist should also exclude
clearly unethical options, thereby guaranteeing that all options are
ethically permissible. If the ethicist is asked for a recommendation
and she feels that it would be appropriate in that particular instance
to issue one, she "should indicate that ... her personal preference
may reflect a bias.""' However, she should be aware that doing so
could make her more vulnerable to a civil action brought against her.
CONCLUSION
Unless society's views about morality, paternalism, and patient
autonomy change and society becomes less litigious, clinical ethicists
who participate in case consultations need to worry about the fact that
they could potentially be held legally liable for the role they play in
188 It is extremely important to understand that I do not claim that the "soft"
model will ensure the best results either for individual patients or for society as a
whole. Rather, I suggest that clinical ethicists should use the "soft" model of consulta-
tion if they want to reduce their exposure to potential liability.
189 Howe, supra note 107, at 146. Howe goes on to explain that "[b]y qualifying
the validity of this ethical opinion, the ethics consultant ... stays within his or her ex-
pertise and is likely to further the credibility of the consultant role." Id.; see also Ack-
erman, supra note 16, at 47 ("Recommendations by the ethics consultant are not ruled
out, but the consulting ethicist must clearly convey the status of the recommendation.
It is not an assertion that a particular course of action has been independently deter-
mined to be the morally correct option.");James F. Drane, Hiring a Hospital Ethicist, in
ETHICS CONSULTATION IN HEALTH CARE, supra note 16, at 117, 122 ("[T] here will cer-
tainly be situations in which the ethicist advocates one opinion over another, but he or
she should only perform this service when asked and should do so without appearing
to take charge of decision making or assuming an air of infallibility.").
[Vol. 151: 667
2002] LEGAL LIABILITY OF CLINICAL ETHICISTS 705
case consultations. Clinical ethicists are not helpless, though. Rather,
there are many steps they can take that will protect them from being
placed in such a situation, including listening to the concerns of the
patients and physicians and attempting to build consensus between
the opposing views, and not offering recommendations. It is not easy
to predict what effect the first finding of liabilityof a clinical ethicist
will have on society, but it is likely that there will be both positive and
negative consequences. My prediction is that a clinical ethicist will be
found liable in the near future, but there will be neither an explosion
of litigation nor a significant alteration of the clinical ethicist's role in
case consultation, as expected-at least, as long as clinical ethicists
learn about the realistic risks of liability and how to avoid them with-
out sacrificing the beneficence of having ethics consultations.
* * * * * *
